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I. INTRODUCTIONO N DECEMBER 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 from
Miami crashed into a mountain on its approach to the Cali,
Colombia airport.' The crash was surprising, especially consid-
ering that the pilots were experienced, familiar with the terrain,
and flying a relatively new 757.2 At first, officials suspected the
crash might have been the result of a terrorist attack or bomb-
ing.' As the investigation unfolded, however, it became clear
that the cause of Flight 965's crash would be more elusive.
When the plane hit the mountain, it was thirteen miles off
course.4 The Colombian government pointed to the course
deviation, blaming the accident on pilot error.5 But some pilots
have taken issue with the Colombian report. Two anonymous
pilots criticize the report as an attempt to make the dead pilots
of Flight 965 into scapegoats. One said that "It]he controller
and pilot didn't understand each other, partly because of lan-
guage problems... [a] nd the controller was giving clearances
that made no sense because he had no radar and couldn't see
the airplane."6
The radar at the Cali airport was blown up by guerrillas in
1991 and was never replaced.7 Colombian officials have denied
I Tapes Point to Pilot Error in Colombia Jet Crash, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 29, 1995, at
A25; Chris Torchia, Bodies X-Rayed for Clues to Crash; Signs of Shrapnel Sought in
Colombia, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 1995, at N13.
2 Pilots Say Colombian Controllers Misunderstood Location of Flight 965, RALEIGH
N.C. NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 3, 1996, at A7.
s Torchia, supra note 1, at N13.
4 Id.
5 Tapes Point to Pilot Error in Colombia Jet Crash, supra note 1, at A25.





that the missing radar was an element of the crash. But Hector
Facundo, a sixteen-year pilot for Colombian airline Avianca and
secretary of the Air Safety Committee of the Colombian Pilots
Association, disagrees. "It is clear from the partial transcript of
the recordings that [Cali controllers] did not know where the
plane was, because they repeatedly asked the pilot to 'report
passing Tulua. "''
Whether or not the cause of the crash is ever determined,
much can be learned from examining the risks involved in that
accident. American Airlines incurred a risk when it continued
to fly into an airport with no radar. It incurred a risk when it
hired the two pilots that flew the 757. It incurred a risk in the
language barrier between the pilots and the Cali ground crew.
Every day, thousands of Americans and millions of people
worldwide fly on commercial air carriers. Additionally, commer-
cial freight carriers ship billions of dollars worth of goods. As
the industry continues to grow, the risk of air crashes will be-
come more frequent. It is estimated that by the year 2010, com-
mercial air accidents could reach the rate of fifty-three per year.9
This accident rate is not considered alarming and can be wholly
attributed to the increase in air traffic.' 0 As a society, we should
not be happy with an "unalarming" air accident rate. Several
leading air safety and risk management experts have called for
an overhaul in the ways that the commercial air industry man-
ages its risks and investigates crashes.
This Comment evaluates the possibilities of new risk manage-
ment and crash investigation techniques. In addition to discuss-
ing the feasibility of these proposals, it considers whom is best
positioned to implement or require these new ideas. Perhaps
most importantly, it grapples with the potential legal issues
faced by the air carriers, their insurers, and regulators if the pro-
posed techniques are adopted.
II. WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT?
Most people think of "risk management" as purchasing liabil-
ity and first party insurance coverage. Indeed, most businesses
of any considerable size have a "risk manager" or even a "risk
8 Id.
9 Robert G. Knowles, Airline-Crash Prevention Seen as Needed, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Nov. 28, 1994, at 21 (esti-
mate given by Paul D. Russell, Boeing's chief airline safety engineer).
10 Id.
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management department." Their main responsibility lies in de-
ciding which types of insurance the company should carry and
with which carriers. As will be shown, insurance also plays an
important role in creating an overall risk management plan to
increase safety. But this Comment is not wholly concerned with
risk management in this popular sense; a comprehensive risk
management plan accomplishes three goals: (1) evaluating loss
potential; (2) utilizing risk management techniques; and (3)
putting together a risk management plan.
A. EVALUATING Loss POTENTIAL
First, the entity seeking to manage its risk must determine
which of its activities create a potential for loss or exposure to
liability.11 Once the entity determines which activities create po-
tential losses, it must calculate the potential amount of loss. 12
The potential amount is not simply the total amount the entity
stands to lose. Rather, it is the total potential loss multiplied by
the percentage chance that the loss will occur.13 Loss is not just
confined to economic setbacks. For example, besides the physi-
cal and monetary losses due to accidents, airlines face the public
relations setbacks that stem from disasters.
At present, crashes are relatively infrequent and the public
reacts with predictable initial shock. After a while, however,
faith in air carriers returns. As the number of flights increases
and the number of crashes increases proportionally, the public
may become less forgiving. Major fatalities are easy to ignore
when they happen once or twice a year. If they begin happen-
II 2 BETrY VAN DER SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE ENTITIES § 23.21 (1990). Van der Smissen's treatise is primarily con-
cerned with liability exposure for sports and recreational activities. But her excel-
lent discussion of risk management holds true for any type of risk-bearing activity.
12 Id. § 23.22.
13 This is a standard insurance doctrine. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAw 4-5 (1971). By way of illustration I offer the following example.
An air freight carrier flies one thousand flights per year. Each flight has the
potential hull loss of $3 million and cargo loss of $1 million. There is a .01%
chance that any given flight will crash. By multiplying these numbers together we
get the carrier's potential loss for the year: 1000 x ($3,000,000 + $1,000,000) x
.0001 = $400,000. In addition to providing a guideline for the amount the carrier
should spend for insurance, this number also indicates the amount of risk the
carrier undertakes. Actions or procedures that increase the amount of the
number, such as hauling cargo worth $2 million in each flight (resulting in a
potential loss amount of $500,000), indicate that the carrier is acting in a riskier




ing every two or three months, public faith in air carriers may
begin to suffer. When the entity understands the amount of its
potential loss it then engages in risk management. By creating
operational plans and procedures, the loss can be minimized. 14
Four basic techniques are used to minimize the loss: elimina-
tion, reduction, transfer, and retention.1 5
B. RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
1. Elimination
The first approach to risk management is elimination.' 6 An
air carrier can eliminate its potential for loss by choosing not to
engage in the risk-bearing activity. In most cases, this is the least
viable option. An air carrier can no longer function if it refuses
to engage in the risky practice of flying aircraft. But limited
adoption of this technique is possible. For instance, removing
aging aircraft from the fleet eliminates the higher crash risk that
those craft impose.
Elimination, also called avoidance, is usually the furthest re-
moved from traditional insurance practice. With some excep-
tions, insurers are usually willing to insure any activity for which
they can quantify risk and attain an adequate pool of insureds. 7
Because of the availability of insurance for most risk-bearing ac-
tivities, insurers have no incentive to guide their insureds to
eliminate all risk-bearing activities. If there is no risk, then there
is no need for insurers.1 8 The decision to avoid risk is primarily
economic. The greatest incentive for avoidance is "to minimize
operational and revenue disruptions."19
14 2 VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 11, § 23.23.
15 Id.
16 Id. § 23.231.
17 This is not to say that every type of activity is insurable. For instance, inten-
tional conduct often cannot be insured for economic and social policy reasons.
Economically, it is cheaper for the insured to forgo the intentional conduct than
obtain insurance. As a matter of social policy, the liability for intentional acts
should be borne by the actor and not a third party.
18 Of course, insurers will want their insureds to incur less liability, but this is
not elimination. See discussion of reduction infra part II.B.2. For example, a
company is considering building a new warehouse, but that will expose it to a risk
of fire. Its insurer is not likely to counsel the company to avoid the risk by not
building the warehouse. Rather, the insurer will try to sell the company insur-
ance coverage for the new warehouse. The insurer will still prefer that the in-
sured install a sprinkler system and reduce the risk of fire loss. But it will also
prefer that the insured build the warehouse, incurring the need for additional
insurance coverage.
19 GRAY CASTLE ET AL., THE BUSINESS INSURANCE HANDBOOK 8 (1981).
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2. Reduction
Reduction is very similar to elimination, but often involves
something less than totally abstaining from the risky action. The
party seeks to reduce the risk accompanying the activity rather
than refusing to engage in it.2 0 A good example of reduction is
Southwest Airlines' short commuter-type flight routes. By creat-
ing several shorter flight plans, Southwest has created broad re-
gional coverage without accepting the higher risk of longer
flights. 2' Its exemplary safety record reflects this reduction. 22
In addition to the obvious pre-loss reduction methods of re-
ducing the chance of an accident, there is also the post-loss
method of loss control. The two main methods for minimizing
a loss that has already occurred are minimization and salvage. 23
This Comment is mainly concerned with flight safety, so post-
loss control is not instantly apparent. It is important to remem-
ber that the potential losses involved are not just economic, but
also social. Given the destructive nature of air accidents, post-
loss control of hull damage and casualties is unlikely. But rapid
response, interaction with grieving families, and excellent pub-
lic relations can minimize the loss of passengers due to poor
consumer confidence. If the public perceives airlines as large
20 Id. at 9.
21 This is not to suggest that risk management was Southwest's primary consid-
eration in creating shorter flight plans. It may not have even been a concern at
all. But whether or not there was a conscious risk management decision, South-
west's practice unquestionably fits into a reduction type of risk management
technique.
22 During the 24 years that Southwest has been flying, it has never had a major
accident. Patrick Barta, Retired Airline Executive Jack Vidal Jr. Dies, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1995, at 26A. Dr. Arnold Barnett, an aviation safety expert,
considers Southwest to be the safest domestic carrier. He feels this is of special
merit given that Southwest's routes fall primarily within areas with high inci-
dences of tornados. Today: MIT Researcher, Dr. Arnold Barnett, Rates the Risk of
Flying by Individual Carrier (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 13, 1994), available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, 1994 WL 3766457. As an example, perhaps, of
the type of aggressive risk management and minimization advocated by this Com-
ment, Southwest has not rested on its spotless safety record. In a memo dated
March 24, 1995, Southwest urged all of its pilots to remain vigilant. The memo
alluded to some failures to observe detail and follow flight procedures. Although
no accidents resulted, Southwest felt it was necessary to admonish the pilots to
"follow[ ] flight procedures, us[e] common sense, pay[ ] attention to detail and
deal[ ] professionally with other pilots." Southwest Airlines Urges Pilots to Focus on
Safety, Associated Press Newswire, May 11, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS
Database, 1995 WL 4387765.
23 C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSUR-
ANCE 178 (5th ed. 1985).
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corporations that can afford to lose an occasional aircraft, then
no amount of safety calculations and comparisons will erase the
fear caused by a fatal accident.
3. Transfer
Another common type of risk management is transfer. This
technique involves shifting the risk of loss to another party, typi-
cally an insurance carrier.24 This technique is the easiest to im-
plement and serves the valuable purpose of creating a risk pool.
The risk-encountering entity can then cooperate with other enti-
ties to ensure a greater likelihood that money will be available to
cover losses. The problem with this technique is that it carries
the chance of "moral hazard." Essentially, the insured entity
may decide to exercise less caution because it no longer bears
the risk of the loss. 25 Insurers try to mitigate the moral hazard
by employing different techniques. But these are not always ef-
fective in creating an incentive for the insured to exercise more
care or in mitigating the total cost to society from the losses.26
4. Retention
The fourth method of risk management is retention. Reten-
tion involves the entity assuming some of the risk itself, either
through a "self-insurance" plan or through a "deductible" im-
posed by the insurer.27 Self-insurance, for the purposes of this
Comment, involves setting aside a periodic premium amount
based on the entity's potential loss and using the created pool to
pay for actual losses as they occur. A deductible is a gap in ini-
tial insurance coverage for which the entity must assume respon-
sibility. Both of these techniques create an incentive for the
entity to lower its risk of loss, thus increasing profits.
Interestingly, complete retention of risk is actually economi-
cally advantageous for the air carrier. If the carrier can deter-
mine with reasonable accuracy what its losses will be for the
year, it can set aside enough money every year (or quarter or
other measuring period) to cover those losses. Essentially, an
24 See id. at 198.
25 See id. at 222. The authors actually refer to insurance creating disincentives
to exercise care as "morale hazard." They define "moral hazard" as "increas[ing]
the chance that some person will intentionally (1) cause a loss or (2) increase its
severity." Id. This seems to be an unnecessary distinction. Whether the loss is
intentional or merely negligent, the end result is the same.
26 See infra discussion accompanying notes 64-69.
27 WILLIAMS & HEINS, supra note 23, at 200, 230.
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insurer engages in this same practice, but on a larger scale. Of
course, the insurer also builds in a profit for itself. By engaging
in complete retention, the air carrier can save this profit
amount. Unfortunately, the air carrier still runs the risk of un-
foreseen losses or unusually high accident rates for the year.
While the air carrier should be able to recover the amount of
the loss by the savings from years without accidents, the present
catastrophic loss could put the carrier out of business before
later savings could be realized.
Insurers mitigate this risk by creating large pools of insureds
from which to draw premiums. The more insureds that fit into
a risk group, the more effectively the insurer can estimate the
potential risk losses. A highly organized form of retention is
"captive insurance" where the insured actually creates a private
insurance company that covers that company's risks only.28 This
is feasible mainly for very large companies that want something
resembling traditional insurance, but prefer to generate under-
writing profits for themselves rather than an insurer.
C. PUTTING TOGETHER A RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
It should be pointed out that these different techniques are
not exclusive. Elimination, for example, can be conceptualized
as a type of reduction. The entity can reduce its overall risk by
eliminating its riskiest endeavors or by eliminating factors and
procedures that create higher risks. Transfer and retention do
not, in themselves, create efficient risk handling. But they can
create incentives for entities to reduce their risks, thus benefit-
ting both themselves and society.
Given that air carriers already engage, at least to some degree,
in transfer and retention, the main concern of this Comment
will be applying reduction techniques to the industry. Certainly,
the industry already engages in some reduction of risk. Federal
Aviation Regulations impose reduction requirements as well.
But industry experts have recently called for more reduction-
type practices in the industry. 29 There are three methods by
which reduction of loss-risk can be accomplished.
The first method is reducing the frequency of the hazard.
This might also be considered a type of elimination technique.
By engaging in risky activities less often, or refusing to engage in
28 CASTLE ET AL., supra note 19, at 17-18.
29 See Knowles, supra note 9, at 21.
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them at all, the airline lowers its overall risk of loss.3" An excel-
lent example can be found in recent headlines. Faced with the
increasing threat of terrorist attacks, the FAA restricted parking
within 300 feet of terminals and banned unattended curbside
vehicles.31 Airport authorities identified unrestricted parking as
potentially risky because a bomb could be planted in a car next
to the airport, causing considerable damage. By restricting
parking, airports reduce their risk of loss.
Ironically, the recent security decisions highlight the
problems involved with government-imposed risk management.
Just less than two months after implementing the new policy,
the FAA relaxed the parking restrictions on November 19,
1995.32 This move was primarily motivated by airport com-
plaints about the inconvenience to Thanksgiving travelers."3
The restrictions were probably excessive to begin with, especially
considering the lack of any specific threats . 4 This type of over-
broad action is a common criticism of government intervention.
The fact that the policy was restricted due to public pressure
and to facilitate holiday travel highlights the inherent weakness
in government agency intervention. Populist and political pres-
sure can undermine otherwise sound policy considerations. Af-
ter the holiday travel season, the FAA readjusted security
measures, but in a less drastic fashion.35 Airports in Dallas, New
30 2 VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 11, § 23.231.
31 Marion Manuel, Airport Parking Rules Irritate Drivers of Vans; Anti-Terrorism
Measures: Restrictions Aimed at Thwarting Truck Bombs Bring Irate Reactions, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 13, 1995, at Al. The order was made on October 1, 1995, and
was "sparked by a number of recent events, including the conviction of Muslims
for the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, the United Nations'
50th anniversary celebration this month, the Arab-Israeli peace process currently
underway and PopeJohn Paul II's visit to the United States." DOT Tightens Airport
Security Again Despite Lack of Definite Threat, WORLD AIRPORT WK., Oct. 10, 1995. It
may also have been related to the paranoia accompanying the Oklahoma City
Bombing of April 19, 1995. The policy was not related to any "specific threat to
aviation or any other form of transportation." Id. (comments of Transportation
Secretary Federico Pefia).
The policy was unpopular, even before it was implemented. Fearing the imple-
mentation as early as August 1995, the Dallas-Fort Worth airport was already pro-
testing the inconvenience of lost parking and revenue and the $70,000 a day in
police overtime. Lisa Miller, Takeoffs & Landings; Safety Second, WALL ST. J., Aug.
25, 1995, at B14. One can only speculate about how this reaction reflects on the
industry's attitude toward risk management.
32 Questions Raised over Eased Airport Security, AIR SAFETY WK., Dec. 4, 1995, at 1.
33 Id.
34 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35 FAA Keeping Low Profile on Airport Security, AIR SAFETY WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 2.
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York, and Atlanta had already implemented the procedures and
were less critical of the orders. 6 This either suggests that re-
strained government action is more easily received or that only
de minimis regulation is acceptable to the industry.
The second technique is similar to the first. By either reduc-
ing the number of accidents while maintaining a constant
number of exposures, or by maintaining the number of acci-
dents while increasing the number of exposures, the airline can
reduce its overall potential loss. 37 As an example of the first
method, consider the risk of a terrorist bombing on a passenger
jet. If an airline reduces the number of incidents from one in
one million to one in two million, it has cut its potential loss by
fifty percent. This could be accomplished in many ways such as
improved baggage screening or better airport security.
The second method is harder to illustrate. Imagine an airline
with an aging fleet of 100 aircraft that creates annual revenues
of $10 million. All of these aircraft are ten years old. Suppose
further that for ten-year-old aircraft there is a 1% chance of a
crash and the loss occurring from the crash will be $1 million.
Given these numbers, the airline has a high probability of incur-
ring a single $1 million loss equalling 10% of its gross income.
The airline adds fifty more new aircraft, generating an addi-
tional $5 million in income with a virtually 0% chance of crashes
in the first yearY3 As a result the airline has increased its expo-
sure to risk by 50%, but it has maintained a constant number of
accidents. Its potential loss is the same, but it is now only 6.7%
of its gross income.
The final technique of reduction is reducing the extent of the
loss. By creating contingencies that mitigate the loss amount,
the airline saves money and reduces the loss to society.39 Exam-
ples of mitigation techniques include pilot training for safer
crash landings and effective passenger evacuation techniques.
Post-crash mitigation can also reduce the amount of loss. Rapid
public relations response and quick creation of new safety pro-
cedures in response to a crash can prevent the loss of valuable
public faith. Failure to address public safety concerns in the me-
dia may result in the loss of future business. These types of
36 See id.
37 See 2 VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 11, § 23.234.
38 Obviously other factors will affect the chance of crashing, but these have
been ignored for the sake of the hypothetical.
39 Cf 2 VAN DER SMISSEN, supra note 11, § 24.234 (discussing the reduction
technique and its benefits).
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losses are largely uninsurable and the only feasible way to man-
age the damage is to avoid them as much as possible.
III. THE NEED FOR IMPROVED RISK MANAGEMENT
Even if the current accident rates are maintained, the number
of commercial airliners will double by 2010.40 Boeing estimates
that failing to adopt preventative risk management techniques
could result in "as many as 53 commercial air crashes a year,
worldwide."'4 1 A Boeing study of 232 crashes occurring between
1982 and 1991 found that the largest cause of those accidents
was "failure of the flight crew to follow approved basic proce-
dures."42 The study also "clearly show[s] that regional and cul-
tural differences among air crew members are factors in causing
accidents and incidents."4" This "implies the need for a variety
of preventative actions, including better flight crew training and
compensating for cultural and regional differences when assem-
bling flight crews. 44
A. CONTROLLED-FLIGHT-INTO-TERRAIN: A RSK MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDY
An excellent practical example of the need for heightened
safety through better reduction techniques can be seen in con-
trolled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accidents. Between 1976 and
1993, seventy-six aircraft accidents were caused by CFIT. Be-
tween 1988 and 1994, thirty-two such accidents were reported. 5
These accidents comprise twenty-five percent of the period's to-
tal hull losses and twenty-one percent of the hull loss costs. 46
The accidents between 1988 and 1994 account for 41% of the
period's passenger fatalities and $1 billion in insurance losses. 47
These numbers are even more striking because almost all
modern aircraft are equipped with ground proximity warning
systems (GPWS). These devices warn cockpit crews of impend-
ing CFIT accidents.48 Despite the widespread use of GPWS,
40 Knowles, supra note 9, at 21.




45 Stacy Shapiro, Aviation Underwiter Calls for Action: Insurers Must Play Safety
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CFIT accidents are not decreasing. According to John Brennan,
chairman and chief executive officer of U.S. Aviation Under-
writers Inc., the problem stems from pilots' lack of understand-
ing about the reliability of the system.49 Early systems were less
reliable and known for giving occasional false alarms. The mod-
ern system, however, averages only one false alarm in 5000
flights.50 A 1989 flight cockpit tape of a Continental Airlines'
Flying Tigers 747 cargo plane indicates the cockpit crew repeat-
edly ignored warnings to pull up. Because of the system's previ-
ous reputation for false alarms, crews are often advised by
instructors to "ignore the warnings."51
B. THE INADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT IMPOSED RISK
MANAGEMENT
Regulatory mandates of GPWS do not appear to have allevi-
ated the problem. The United States has required major air car-
riers to implement the system since 1975.52 The problem may
lie in the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) man-
date to only identify the probable cause of the accident.53 The
NTSB's report on such accidents is likely to read "pilot failed to
pull up." This is certainly an accurate description of the acci-
dent's probable cause, but it fails to suggest any solutions.
There is no explanation as to why the pilot ignored the system.
There are no recommendations as to how to avoid similar acci-
dents in the future.
C. "CHAIN-OF-EVENTS" ANALYSIS
Instead of probable cause, classical risk management analyzes
the entire chain of events leading to the accident. Multiple ac-
tions that could have averted the crash are identified. These not
49 See id. (comments ofJohn Brennan).
50 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 13.
51 Id.
52 14 C.F.R. § 121.360 (1995). "[A]fter December 1, 1975, no person may op-
erate a turbine-powered airplane unless it is equipped with a ground proximity
warning system .... [T] he Airplane Flight Manual shall contain-(1) Appropri-
ate procedures for-(i) The use of the equipment; (ii) Proper flight crew action
with respect to the equipment." Id. § 121.360(a), (b)(1)(i), (ii). Aside from the
manual requirements, there is no explicit regulatory mandate of pilot training on
the use or reliability of the equipment.
A similar requirement for any turbine-powered airplanes with 10 or more pas-
senger seats took effect on April 20, 1994. Id. § 135.153.
5 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 831.4, 1131 (1995). The NTSB is to investigate all of the
relevant facts about the accident to determine if probable cause exists. Id.
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only pertain to the pilot, but also to other actors who could have
alerted the pilot to his error. Paul D. Russell, Boeing's chief
airline safety engineer, identifies five actions that could prevent
such a crash.54
First, the pilot could have detected the mistake and pulled up
in time to avoid crashing into the ground. Even without the
GPWS, the pilot should have been able to detect the low altitude
and compensate accordingly. The next possible way to have
avoided the accident would have been for the pilot to maintain
the proper altitude, thus avoiding the need to pull up at all.
The pilot's failure to maintain a proper altitude could indicate
more serious problems such as pilot fatigue or inattention. An-
other possible way to avoid the crash would have been for the
co-pilot to detect the mistake of the pilot. Similarly, the air traf-
fic controller could have discovered the plane's low altitude on
a cross-check and told the pilot to pull up. Finally, the cockpit
crew could have heeded the GPWS.5 5
Rather than just seeking to assess blame or identify a single
cause, risk management identifies several ways to increase
safety.56 The five actions that could have avoided the crash im-
mediately suggest at least four inexpensive, easily instituted ways
to decrease the risk of a crash. In order to have the pilot detect
and correct the low altitude or maintain proper altitude, air car-
riers could better train the pilots in those techniques. Instituting
more frequent and better co-pilot cross-checks would increase
the chance that the co-pilot could detect the error in time. In-
creased air-controller vigilance would make it more likely that
the pilot would get a warning from the ground. Finally, better
pilot training on the function and reliability of the GPWS would
promote better reaction when the system gives an alarm.
IV. WHO SHOULD IMPLEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT?
If it is agreed that the air carrier industry would benefit from
greater risk management, it is necessary to decide who should
execute such a plan. Four distinct entities could engage in or
mandate a chain-of-events risk management analysis. Each pos-
54 Knowles, supra note 9, at 21.
55 Id.
56 Probable cause analysis is also likely to underrepresent the wide variety of
causes of similar accidents. In the CFIT accident example, supra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text, the probable cause would be that the pilot failed to pull up.
It remains unknown whether the pilot failed to pull up because he was inatten-
tive, misunderstood the warning, or believed that the GPWS was untrustworthy.
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sible entity has advantages and disadvantages. The FAA and
NTSB could engage in risk management, but air carriers are
likely to resist these attempts. The air carriers themselves could
utilize these techniques, but it is questionable how much they
would be motivated to use this sort of analysis without a regula-
tory or statutory mandate. The insurance carriers could engage
in risk management analysis. The insurance carriers are proba-
bly best suited to this task because they already have established
techniques in place for assessing risk.
A. REGULATORY RISK MANAGEMENT
1. The Current Role of the NTSB
The modern regulatory system came into existence when
Congress created the United States Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) in 1966. When it created the DOT, Congress also
created the NTSB.57 Under the statute, the NTSB has the au-
thority to make two findings about air accidents. First, the
NTSB reports the facts and circumstances of the accident.
Then, based on those facts and circumstances, the NTSB is to
report its finding of the probable cause of the accident. 58
The principal purpose of the NTSB is to promote safety. It
accomplishes this by using its investigative functions. Based
upon these investigations, the NTSB is supposed to develop rec-
ommendations about how to prevent future accidents. This is
clearly shown in the language of the statute creating the NTSB.
The NTSB should "propose corrective action to make the trans-
portation of individuals as safe and free from risk of injury as
possible. 59 Once the NTSB has made these recommendations,
the DOT can enact them as enforceable regulations.6" The
NTSB has no official regulatory power of its own. It cannot pro-
mulgate its own safety mandates. But the NTSB's regulatory rec-
ommendations have an acceptance rate of eighty percent by
various regulatory agencies.61
While the NTSB has proven effective, there is room for im-
provement. Paul D. Russell, Boeing's chief airline safety engi-
neer, thinks that the NTSB's probable cause determination is
57 49 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-670, § 6, 8 Stat. 938).
58 Id. § 1131; 49 C.F.R. § 845.40 (1995).
59 49 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(2).
60 Id. § 1135.
61 1983 NTSB ANN. REP. 4.
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not enough. "We're calling for a shift from a cause-analysis ap-
proach to analyzing aircraft accidents to... analyzing the chain
of events that led to them."62 Even though the NTSB has moved
toward a risk management approach "[it] still lacks a mandate
to identify anything other than the probable cause of an
accident."63
By engaging in a chain-of-events risk management analysis,
the NTSB would gain a better understanding of the accident.
For example, just determining probable cause of an accident
might indicate that the crash was caused by pilot error. Pilot
error can hardly be corrected by regulation; the best the NTSB
could hope for would be to attack the problem laterally. Man-
dating more pilot training and better screening might have
some effect, but pilots would still commit errors. But if the
NTSB investigated other actions that might have averted the ac-
cident such as more co-pilot cross-checks to catch the error, it
could create effective new regulations.
A regulation mandating more frequent cross-checks might
have a profound effect on the occurrence of pilot error. The
same might also hold true for a change in air traffic controller
monitoring of aircraft altitude. As self-apparent as these seem,
they only become truly apparent when we look at the series of
events that failed to prevent the accident rather than just the
singular "probable cause" as currently mandated for the NTSB.
Probable cause only identifies the imminent reason for the acci-
dent. A finding of "the pilot failed to pull up" explains why the
plane crashed. But we still do not know why the pilot did not
pull up and how this could be avoided in the future.
2. Why Regulate? Insurance and the Downfall of Reasonable Care
Of course, the air carriers themselves should have reasonable
incentives to engage in these practices without regulatory inter-
ference. But it is important to consider the effects and limita-
tions of insurance. To a certain extent, the existence of liability
insurance itself may discourage effective risk management. As
the risk has been transferred to the insurer, the insured (in this
case, the air carrier) may feel free not to engage in any other
desirable and highly appropriate risk management techniques.64
62 Knowles, supra note 9, at 21.
63 Id.
64 See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF.
L. REv. 772, 790-93 (1985); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73
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Insurance carriers attempt to counteract this somewhat by using
deductibles.65
Besides deductibles, the insurer can also create an incentive
for the air carrier to be more careful through the use of risk-
responsive premiums.66 Risk-responsive premiums involve the
insurer assessing the actual risk involved in the air carrier's activ-
ities. Premiums are then adjusted so they reflect the actual cost
of the potential loss involved in the risk-bearing activities. The
goal of acquiring a lower premium creates an incentive for the
air carrier to act more safely to acquire a lower premium. If
this is possible, the moral hazard posed by liability insurance
may be minimized. Punitive damages may also provide a de-
terrent if the injured plaintiffs can prove that the air carrier en-
gaged in risky behavior believing that its insurance would shield
it from liability and allow it to continue to realize a profit.6 9
CAL. L. REv. 555, 603 (1985); Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1153, 1155 (1989) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)); cf also P.S. Atiyah, No Fault Compen-
sation: A Question That Will Not Go Away, 54 TUL. L. REv 271, 288 (1980); Peter
Cane, Justice and Justifications for Tort Liability, 2 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 30, 44-46
(1982).
5 This is a method of forcing the insured air carrier to accept some retention
of the risk. See discussion of risk management techniques supra part II.B. I sub-
mit, however, that this method is not wholly effective. For example, suppose an
insured has single accident coverage up to $200 million with a $100,000 deducti-
ble. If one accident a year (resulting in $200 million in damages) could be
avoided by spending $200,000 in prevention programs, that would be economi-
cally beneficial. But the insured has a disincentive to pay the $200,000 avoidance
cost because it will only be losing a $100,000 deductible instead of the $200,000
in training costs. This is not to say that insurers cannot avoid this moral hazard in
other ways. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
66 For a discussion of risk-responsive premiums, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Eth-
ics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 313 (1990).
67 To help understand this it is useful to reconsider the hypothetical in supra
note 65. The insured has no incentive to engage in safer behavior if that behav-
ior will cost more than the $100,000 deductible, say $200,000. The insurer can
make engaging in the safer behavior an underwriting criteria. Then, by raising
the base insurance rate $100,000 (the difference in cost between the deductible
and the risk avoidance technique) the insurer can offer a discount of $100,000 in
the premiums if the air carrier will engage in the safer practice. Given that the
economic incentives are equal on either side, it is expected that the air carrier
will choose to avoid the accident.
68 See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 336-37.
69 Given the present societal, political, and judicial disfavor for punitive dam-
ages, I am disinclined to put too much faith in the ability of punitives to make
our society safer. Additionally, there has been much discussion about the possi-
bility of allowing insurance for punitive damages. Such a development would
likely turn the tort liability incentive on its head. Decisions about the amount of
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3. Just Compensation Is Not Enough
Aside from the hazards posed by liability insurance, it is im-
portant to consider what liability insurance does not accom-
plish. Insurance adequately compensates known victims who
can prove that they were directly injured, but compensation
should be a last ditch effort. If accidents can be avoided in a
cost-effective manner, society will realize a much greater benefit.
Liability insurance does not fully compensate for losses
caused by risky behavior. Not all the victims of accidents are
compensated. Decedents without families pass on no standing
for recovery. Their deaths and losses go without compensation.
That is not to say that there is no loss for these victim's deaths.
They may be productive employees or entrepreneurs, but the
economic effects of their deaths are not compensable.
For that matter, losses resulting from the deaths or injuries of
victims with families are not compensable unless claimed by the
families. For example, if a small business owner died in an air
accident, resulting in the forced closing of her business, society
as a whole would not be completely compensated. The victim's
husband and children could recover the amount of lost earn-
ings that they would have received, but the victim's employees
would be left jobless with no compensation for their loss.
Even the compensation families do receive often proves inad-
equate. The Warsaw Convention contains damage caps that cre-
ate a de facto inadequacy in many cases.70 If the loss suffered by
an individual victim or her estate and family exceeds the dam-
age cap, then there will be inadequate compensation. The ever
present lack of adequate coverage also serves to undercompen-
sate. A small air carrier with $1 million in coverage and $2 mil-
lion in damages is likely to disappear, leaving at least $1 million
of undercompensated losses.
Even more important than the undercompensation of victims,
however, is the realization that liability insurance coverage does
not lower the loss to society. The value of insurance is that it
creates large reserves of capital that are available to protect the
insured against a high loss. If the insurer wishes to remain solu-
risk prevention to engage in would be likely to have much more basis in profit
margins than acceptable levels of safety.
70 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3000, 3006, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, 24 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention] (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40105
(1994)).
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ble, it must charge premiums that will create a reserve large
enough to cover all the potential losses. The cost of these pre-
miums is spread among all members of society. This creates a
lowering of capital available for investment.
An example best demonstrates this idea. Suppose a carrier
pays $210,000 per year to insure against a $1 million hull loss.
This premium is based on a twenty percent chance that the car-
rier will suffer such a loss each year.71 After ten years, the carrier
does indeed suffer such a loss. It uses the insurance proceeds to
purchase a new aircraft. The insured is left in the same position
it was before the accident, but the insured has lost over $2 mil-
lion in insurance premiums. Essentially it has received one air-
plane for the price of two. Economically, it is more efficient for
the carrier to avoid the accident than to insure itself. Insurance
should ideally act as a safety net for our society when extreme
situations so dictate. It is not effective as a means of reducing
risk or enhancing safety.
Because insurance may counteract the tort incentive, even if
only to a slight degree, government regulation has a place in the
risk management process. If the economic incentives of the tort
system fail to elicit reasonably safe actions, government regula-
tion can augment the usual tort incentives. When an air carrier
operates in an unreasonably risky manner, the FAA or DOT can
impose fines or revoke the carrier's license. Such penalties are
typically uninsurable and the carrier will have to choose be-
tween further penalties or a personal loss.
As part of the existing regulatory scheme, air carriers are al-
ready required to obtain minimum amounts of liability insur-
ance. 72 These minimums are useful in assuring that adequate
reserves are available to compensate for liability. But they do
not address the possibility of moral hazard resulting from this
insurance coverage. Carriers can self-insure and meet the re-
quirements of the regulations; 73 this would help mitigate the
moral hazard problem.74 But the regulations do not require
either self-insurance or a deductible that would give the carriers
added incentives to act safely.
71 The extra $10,000 per year covers the insurer's overhead and profit.
72 14 C.F.R. § 205.5(b), (c), (e) (1996).
73 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 205.3-.4 (requiring that carriers provide proof of insurance
or an adequate self-insurance plan and the filing of insurance or self-insurance
plans).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
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4. The Drawbacks to Regulation
This is not to say that government regulation is a panacea.
Contemporary conventional wisdom disfavors most, if not all,
government interference in free commerce. 75 This is not en-
tirely unfounded. Government solutions to problems are often
unwieldy and expensive, resulting in disarray and wasted re-
sources. Besides these more ideological arguments, however,
two practical objections can be raised to "chain-of-events" re-
ports issued by the NTSB: evidentiary and commercial.
As evidence, an NTSB report giving more than probable
cause creates a severe prejudice to an air carrier defendant.
Presently, NTSB accident reports are admissible with the excep-
tion of the actual probable cause determination. 76 As early as
1951, federal courts allowed testimony of Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) agents to be used in court.77 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals allowed into evidence a CAB agent's
testimony in Universal Airline v. Eastern Airlines.78 The court al-
lowed the testimony because it was the most immediate post-
accident observation available.79 Similarly, in American Airlines v.
United States80 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed into
evidence flight recorder data compiled in a CAB report."' The
court also explained that opinion testimony should generally be
allowed, unless the opinion "embraces the probable cause of the
accident or the negligence of the defendant."82 This view was
affirmed in Kline v. Martin83 when the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia allowed normal acci-
dent report opinion as evidence because "it is only the ultimate
issue, the probable cause of the accident, that is prohibited. 8 4
Because any NTSB opinions as to possible actions that would
have averted the accident are not probable cause or a determi-
75 See Patrick Crowley, Republicans Seek Smaller Government, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb.
14, 1996, at B02; Clinton: FDR Today Would Urge Smaller Government, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Apr. 13, 1995, at A19.
76 Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972). See discussion infra accom-
panying notes 82-84.
77 The CAB was the precursor of the FAA and generated accident reports de-
termining the probable cause of the accident much like the NTSB does today.
78 188 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
79 Id.
80 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
81 Id. at 196.
82 Id.
83 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
84 Id. at 32.
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nation of the carrier's negligence, they would appear to be ad-
missible under the present case law. Air carriers will naturally
be averse to seeing such reports in court. In these instances, the
carrier would not have to defend against a single claim of negli-
gent behavior. Instead, the carrier would face multiple in-
stances of possible negligence. These different instances would
be delivered ready-made to potential plaintiffs. To return to the
example of CFIT accidents, 5 at least four occasions in the
"chain of events" might constitute the carrier's negligence. This
is not to say that plaintiffs could win on all or any of these issues,
but the carrier will incur the added expense of litigating the
claims. It will also have to rebut the very credible report of a
government agent that is likely to hold great weight with the
jury.
Besides the evidence issue, air carriers may simply want to
keep chain-of-events analysis from being used against them in
the public's perception. Recently, airline representatives have
complained about the presence of the FAA's new safety per-
formance analysis system (SPAS) at four airports.8 6 SPAS tracks
the performance and safety records of air carriers to determine
if air safety trends are developing. 7 The airlines are concerned
that the analysis done by the system "could be subject to release
under Freedom of Information Act requests and might be a ba-
sis for attempts of comparative rankings of airline operators."88
Consumers who discover a long list of events that could have
averted an accident may conclude that the list indicates a high
level of negligence. On the contrary, such reports are more
likely to reflect only the complexity of flight and the extreme
care taken in preparing the report. But this will offer little sol-
ace to a carrier that loses customers when such a report be-
comes public.
B. SELF-CONDUCTED RISK MANAGEMENT
1. Existing Risk Management in the Industry
In many ways, the airline industry already engages in some
risk management techniques. The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
85 See supra part III.A.
86 FAA Fields Computerized Safety Check System: Airlines Fear FOIAs, AVIATION
DAILY, Sept. 29, 1995, at 521.
87 Id.
88 Id. (comments of Roger Fleming, senior vice president of technical develop-
ment for the Air Transport Association).
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ond Circuit described the Warsaw Convention itself as
"spread[ing] the accident cost of air transportation among all
passengers."89 The court further stated that this purpose of the
Warsaw Convention is supported in the supposition that "the
protection of the passenger ranks high among the goals which
the Warsaw signatories now look to the Convention to serve."90
Was the court correct that the Warsaw Convention advances
the goals of passenger safety? The specific facet of the Warsaw
Convention that the court referred to was the (then) absolute
liability amount of $75,000 for accidents occurring while board-
ing, leaving, or on board the aircraft.91 This provision is actually
a combination of two of the classic risk management techniques:
retention and reduction.
Absolute liability forces the carrier to retain the risk. With
negligence liability, an air carrier might be inclined to "play
against the risk." If the carrier believes that it can engage in
cheaper, riskier behavior and beat the odds, then it might be
willing to do it. Logic and the law of large numbers dictate that
the carrier will always lose in this transaction. When the carrier
engages habitually in negligent actions, a predictable amount of
injuries will occur. The carrier will be liable for these injuries,
which will often cost more than the amount to engage in less
risky behavior. But if we factor in the chance that a negligent
carrier might win on a lawsuit when it actually has been negli-
gent, the situation becomes more complicated.
For example, if the cost of non-negligent operation is
$100,000 more than the cost of negligent operation, and if the
total amount of damages resulting from negligent operation will
be $150,000, then the carrier should have an incentive to oper-
ate non-negligently. The problem is, the carrier may feel, prob-
ably justifiably, that it can beat at least $50,000 of the liability in
court. Suddenly, the incentives on either side are equal. Strict
liability defeats this perverse incentive. As long as the cost to
89 Day v. TWA, 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
In Day, passengers waiting to board a plane in Athens were killed by grenade-
throwing terrorists. The defendant, TWA, argued that the Warsaw Convention
should only be applied to air accidents and not mishaps while waiting to board.
The court rejected TWA's argument, largely by viewing the Warsaw Convention
as a risk management device, the purposes of which were furthered by allowing
suits of this nature.
9o Id. at 37.
91 Id. at 33 (citing Warsaw Convention, art. 17, supra note 70).
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avoid the injury is less that the possible resulting damages, the
carrier is wise to work to avoid the injury.92
It is not hard to see, however, that this sort of retention alone
could easily lead to the end of the commercial flight industry.
Given no opportunity to prove lack of culpability, one large acci-
dent could create massive amounts of liability, threatening to
destroy the air carrier. The amount of available insurance is fi-
nite and based on risks foreseeable by the insurer. If standard
tort damages were always allowed, then unforeseeable contin-
gencies could exceed the level of liability insurance and force
the airline to declare bankruptcy or go out of business.
For example, many states allow survival recovery equal to the
lost wages the decedent was likely to earn over her expected life-
time." This creates the possibility of an unforeseeable amount
of liability stemming from an air accident. If twenty highly com-
pensated CEOs are flying to an international convention and
their plane crashes in the Andes, the potential unrestricted tort
judgments could be enormous. Suppose each CEO earns an av-
erage of $70,000 per year.9 4 If the average life expectancy of the
CEOs was 30 years, then the total amount of potential liability
just for the CEOs would be $450 million. This would not even
include recovery for the deaths of the other passengers or the
possibility of other noneconomic damages like pain and suffer-
ing and mental anguish95 or the wrongful death damages that
might be allowed for a spouse or surviving children.96 It is easy
92 Insurance may still work to thwart this incentive. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 64-70.
9'3 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21(6)(a) (West 1996) (allowing the dece-
dent's estate to recover loss of earning that would have accrued during the dece-
dent's normal lifetime minus living expenses); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns
1996) (allowing the recovery of the decedent's wages lost as a result of the wrong-
ful death).
94 In order to simplify the hypothetical, average amounts will be used instead
of actual income and life expectancy. Actual numbers might yield slightly differ-
ent results.
95 Texas, for instance, allows recovery for both of these types of damages. The
seminal case in the area is, ironically, a suit resulting from an air accident; Yowell
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d. 630 (Tex. 1986). The relatives of the dece-
dents from the crash of a Piper PA-31-310 recovered the loss of the decedents'
future earnings. Id. at 632. (In Texas, the future earnings are typified as the
plaintiff s loss of inheritance or economic support.) In addition, the decedents'
estates recovered $500,000 each for mental anguish that the decedents suffered
resulting from the mid-air breakup of the plane. Id. at 634.
96 Texas also allows generous recovery in the wrongful death area. Sanchez v.
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983). In that case, a 14-year-old was killed in a
traffic accident. No lost wages were awarded because the decedent was a minor
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to see how one accident might bankrupt an air carrier if strict
liability were imposed without any type of damage restrictions.
By imposing a cap on occurrences, the industry has also en-
gaged in classic reduction. Air carriers can engage in the same
number of risky events (namely, making flights) without having
to encounter extreme levels of liability. The risk of accidents
occurring is not reduced, but the liability stemming from the
accident is minimized. This does not create a safety incentive,
but it balances the harshness of strict liability, which does en-
courage safety.
2. Existing Models for Improved Risk Management
The American aviation industry should look to other players
in the world market for examples of how risk management
could be employed. Many European airlines have begun aggres-
sive risk management and assessment programs. Singapore Air-
lines, with one of the world's most enviable safety records, has
likewise enacted a highly progressive risk management system. 97
Often programs involve coalitions of air carriers who pool
their information in order to better utilize their resources and
create even more economic benefit from the risk management
plans. In the past few years, major European airlines have
formed a strong coalition to collect and analyze safety data
about their aircraft using a program known as the British Air-
ways safety information system (BASIS). BASIS was developed
for British Airways by an in-house team and was originally in-
tended only for the British Airways fleet.98 In 1993, 43 airlines
and 105 industry members that belong to the European Re-
gional Airlines Association (ERA) joined BASIS.99
BASIS maintains data on each type of aircraft operated by the
member air carriers. The system's large database is intended to
allow an analysis of trends under headings like "Instruments,
child. The Texas Supreme Court upheld an award of damages to the parents for
mental anguish and loss of companionship. Id. at 251. Similar damages were
awarded to decedents' survivors in Yowell. Yowell, 703 S.W.2d at 635-36. Typically,
awards for nontangible losses of this type are unpredictable and can be quite
large.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
98 Arthur Reed, ERA Under BASIS Blanket, (European Regional Airlines Association
Uses Computerized Risk Management Program), AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Sept. 1, 1993,
at 28.
99 ERA Joins BASIS to Enhance Members' Safety Management, COMMUTER REGIONAL
AiRLINE NEWS INT'L, May 24, 1993.
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Human Factors, and False Warning.""°' By using this informa-
tion, airlines will be able to "evaluate flight and ground proce-
dures, to identify shortcomings in equipment and potential
airfield hazards."'01 The program's potential is very large be-
cause it incorporates the information of multiple air carriers.
Rather than just rely on its own data, a member carrier can learn
from the mistakes and successes of other carriers.
ERA plans to create a periodic digest based on the products of
the system. The digest will identify common types of incidents
by aircraft type. These incidents could include "trend analyses,
event summaries and articles on specific aircraft fleet trends and
airport trend analysis, identification of rogue equipment, sum-
maries of individual events and verbatim reproduction of air
safety reports." 0 2 Such information could be invaluable to a
comprehensive risk management system. Each of these items
could give rise to a chain-of-events analysis. Identifying the risks
presented by each piece of information could create contingen-
cies and risk reducing methods to cover the entire spectrum of
encountered risk.
The system is also effective because it does not just deal with
large, catastrophic accidents. The program encourages the re-
porting of any incident "from malfunctioning 'undercarriage
down' lights to collisions with service vehicles on the ramp; from
bird strikes to minor injuries suffered by cabin staff because of
galley equipment."'' 0 3 The system encourages the free exchange
of this information by stripping all the reports of carrier identifi-
cation.'0 4 The program even allows carriers to file written inci-
dent reports; the hope is that these reports will eventually be
filed directly into the BASIS computer via modem, eliminating
the need for extra paperwork.0 5
The best feature of the system is that it allows the carriers to
pool their resources in a single risk management effort, which
creates economic efficiency. Instigating and maintaining an in-




103 Reed, supra note 98, at 28.
104 This may be one workable solution to American air carrier's objections to
SPAS. If the purpose of SPAS is indeed to identify potential safety trends and
suggest solutions, then identification of the carrier involved should be irrelevant.
Valuable suggestions about ways to avoid accidents should be shared with the
entire industry and not just with the carrier in question.
105 Reed, supra note 98, at 28.
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prohibitive, especially to a smaller carrier. In addition, the large
sample created by the conglomeration of large aircraft fleets
makes assessments of the risk management system faster. An air
carrier maintaining a fleet of one hundred aircraft might need
ten years to determine if its new pilot education program will
really lower the number of CFITs. By the time the carrier could
make that determination, it may have spent a disproportionate
amount of money on a system that is ineffective. This could be a
disincentive for carriers to engage in aggressive risk manage-
ment. But if that same fleet of one hundred aircraft pools its
information with nineteen other air carriers implementing the
same safety system, an effective evaluation of the risk manage-
ment system might be possible in as little as six months.1 0 6
Singapore Airlines boasts one of the world's best safety
records. In forty years it has only experienced one major inci-
dent-a hijacking in 1991.107 The airline considers risk manage-
ment to be "a very instinctive part" of its operations.1 8 By taking
high deductibles on its insurance policies, the airline promotes
department accountability for the losses that occur both in hull
damage and liability."0 9 The program also includes daily risk
reviews. 110
Another interesting aspect of the airline's approach to risk
management is that the goals include more than just avoiding
crashes. The company has formulated an entire crisis response
procedure. For example, the company has methods dictating
the manner in which casualties are to be transported, and the
type of press exposure that should be allowed. The company
also plans to link all regional managers on a crisis alert until
discovery of the incident's location. This assures swift reaction
to the crisis, possibly saving lives and avoiding unflattering me-
dia coverage.1"'
106 Six months is a rough estimate based on the assumption that all twenty
carriers engaging in the information sharing are similarly situated in terms of
types of equipment, number of aircraft, and frequency and duration of flights.
Twenty times the information would be available to evaluate a safety program
and the evaluation could be completed in 1/20 of the time necessary for a single
carrier to make the same conclusions. One twentieth of ten years (120 months)
is six months.
107 Stacy Shapiro, Airline Is Ready When Crisis Occurs; Singapore Carrier Drafts De-
tailed Plan, Bus. INS., Oct. 19, 1992, at 12.
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3. Special Advantages to Good Risk Management
Singapore Airlines demonstrates that risk-creating activities
are not always limited to activities traditionally considered risk-
creating. After an aircraft accident, the air carrier is still ex-
posed to added losses through damage to corporate image and
public goodwill stemming from the air carrier's poor reaction
and its inability to control the situation. 12
Maintaining an image of safety through risk control can fore-
close potential business losses when there is a rise in public con-
cern. For example, following the September 8, 1994, crash of a
USAir 737 near Pittsburgh, travel agents began to have
problems with passenger's refusing to fly on 737s."3 One Massa-
chusetts agent said, " [T] hey don't want to fly on a 737 with any
carrier."" 14 But Southwest Airlines, with its fleet composed ex-
clusively of 193 737s, experienced no problems." 5
I can tell you that we're not getting calls from people saying I
don't want to get on your planes because they're 737s and
they're not safe .... Also, any time the FAA or Boeing make[s]
any recommendations on safety issues regarding airplanes, we
generally are working on it before the mandate is even issued."16
The lack of consumer concern can probably be attributed in no
small part to Southwest's outstanding safety record and risk
management techniques." 7
4. Disadvantages to Self-Imposed Risk Management
It should be noted that self-imposed risk management by air
carriers is not without its drawbacks. If air carriers are unable to
112 Losses to image and goodwill may not be insurable. Even if one could ob-
tain a policy protecting these things, collecting on a claim would be problematic.
The amount of damage would be difficult to prove, and monetary compensation
for such intangible losses would be inadequate. An air carrier would be much
better served by avoiding such losses than by seeking to insure against them. This
effectively forecloses the possibility that an air carrier could manage these risks
through transfer. The carrier is forced to retain the risks and try to reduce the
damage. For more discussion about how these two techniques work together, see
the discussion of strict liability supra in text accompanying notes 92-96.
13 Few Travelers Shy Away from USAir, 737s; Tarrant County Agents Say People Seem
More Concerned About the Safety of the Airline than the Plane, FORT WORTH STAR-TELE-




117 For a discussion of Southwest's record and risk management, see supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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form coalitions like the European BASIS program, they could
be forced to make expensive mistakes. The greater the database
of incidents and potential problems, the more accurate the risk
management program. For example, if an air carrier's aircraft
has an accident related to navigation systems, that carrier might
decide to create a risk management plan to deal with the prob-
lem. After expending money to create training programs and
new procedures, the carrier might discover that the incident was
a freak occurrence. Without a sufficiently broad sample, data
can easily become difficult or impossible to interpret correctly.
The evidence problems in a regulatory scheme also apply in
this scenario. 118 As reports generated by the carrier pursuant to
an accident investigation, risk management chain-of-events anal-
yses might be subject to discovery and admissible into court as
evidence. In addition, opinions about causes of the accidents
may be admissible as a statement of a party opponent in litiga-
tion.11 9 The carrier can find no evidentiary refuge in creating its
own reports.
C. INSURERS AS RISK MANAGERS
1. Existing Risk Management
Of the three entities involved in safety for the air carrier in-
dustry, the insurance carrier is best qualified to execute an ag-
gressive risk management system. In fact, most insurers already
engage in all three aspects of risk management planning, but
for their own benefit, rather than the benefit of their insureds.
The insurer practices elimination through the underwriting pro-
cess. After evaluating the risks presented by covering an in-
sured, the insurance company decides whether to write a policy.
The insurer then retains the risk that it accepts. It collects the
premium amounts and creates a reserve that it believes will be
sufficient to cover any contingency in the case of a loss.1 20 Once
the insurance company has accepted and prepared for the risk,
it attempts to reduce its exposure.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
119 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
120 Note how elimination and retention affect each other in this arrangement.
If the insurer discovers that it cannot charge premiums high enough to cover the
insured's potential losses, it must choose to eliminate the risk by refusing to write
coverage. Likewise, by eliminating bad risks, the insurer is able to create a re-
serve with lower premiums, thereby attracting more potential insureds and in-
creasing the profit margin.
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2. Experience and Positioning: Advantages to Insurer-Based Risk
Management
Insurance companies are in the best position to formulate
and impose risk management programs. Insurers amass large
databases of information, and unlike the FAA or NTSB, their
accident and incident reports often include more than just
probable cause. In order to create the most accurate represen-
tation of the probability that an insured will suffer a loss, insur-
ance companies want to determine which acts or omissions of
the insured are related to accident occurrences. Unfortunately,
insurers typically do not share this information with the insured.
Each insurance carrier has its own proprietary system of deter-
mining loss probabilities and is usually unwilling to divulge that
information to the insured.
As a potential detraction from the safety incentives of tort and
strict liability, insurers arguably should be held more responsi-
ble for ensuring adequate safety and risk management meas-
ures. 121 The simplest way to minimize the moral hazard aspect is
for insurers to utilize a premium system that is risk responsive.
That is, the premiums accurately reflect the potential risk of the
insured's activities. 122 Insurers could also increase safety by shar-
ing more information about their findings as to how accidents
could be avoided.
Insurer-created chain-of-events analysis would be effective for
two reasons. First, analysis of a few accidents would yield sugges-
tions for safety measures that could be instituted by all of the
insurance company's clients. In turn, if a number of those in-
sureds simultaneously instituted the suggested measures, then a
faster determination as to the effectiveness of the techniques
could be made. In addition, the chain of events leading to a
specific accident could affect safety beyond the immediate scope
of that specific accident. For instance, in CFIT instances 123 it
might be determined that more frequent co-pilot cross-checks is
the most effective way to avoid CFITs in the future. Besides low-
ering the number of CFITs, cross-checks could also serve to
121 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the effect
of insurance on tort incentives.
122 See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 336-40 (Schwartz argues that risk responsive
premiums all but eliminate the moral hazards posed by liability insurance). I am
unwilling to concede that moral hazards disappear when premiums are suffi-
ciently tied to risk, but I do think it goes a long way to remove the disincentives.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56, for a discussion of the chain-of-
events analysis and how it suggests ways to avoid CFIT accidents.
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lower the instances of other accidents. The insurer, analyzing
multiple accident chains of events, could find the most efficient
way to avoid several different types of hazards by making one
procedural change. Co-pilot cross-checks might be the second
best way to avoid five different types of accidents, but the only
one common to all five kinds of accidents. If insurers mandated
more frequent cross-checks, it would lower the occurrence of
five accident types in an efficient manner. An air carrier doing
its own analysis would have to rely on its own (hopefully) rare
accidents and is unable to see the overall efficiency of using co-
pilot cross-checks (number two on the list of ways to avoid the
accident) over the top-ranked method of avoiding the accident.
The ability of insurers to create changes in safety practices of
its insureds should not be underestimated. The introduction of
seat belts into passenger aircraft was prompted by insurance car-
riers. 124 John Brennan, chairman and chief executive officer of
U.S. Aviation Underwriters, believes that "[i]nsurers have to
take a more proactive stance in [the] area of aircraft safety....
We certainly cannot wait for action to be taken by various regu-
latory agencies." 125
Specifically in regards to CFITs, Brennan offers ways in which
insurance carriers should take a more proactive stance in safety
and risk management. First, he believes that insurers should en-
courage the use of the latest safety technology. 126 This is proba-
bly not as necessary for CFIT accidents because of the GPWS's
already strong presence in American aircraft. But as we have
seen, presence of the technology is not enough to assure
safety.127 In order to allow the technology to work, Brennan also
wants insurance carriers to encourage effective training
programs. 2 8
Encouraging the greater use of technology and training are
methods of reduction that the insurers can use to lower their
(and their insureds') losses. Brennan encourages insurers to re-
mind air carriers that compliance with regulations is not neces-
sarily proof of safety.129  Installation of GPWS has been
mandated by regulations for over a decade, but CFIT accidents
124 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 12.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
128 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 12.
129 Id.
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have not dropped in that time; they have increased.1 3 0 Re-
minding carriers of their responsibilities and putting a corre-
sponding onus on the carriers to abide by those responsibilities
is another way to reduce the risk of loss. Finally, Brennan be-
lieves that insurers should create rating standards that accu-
rately reflect an air carrier's safety based on its participation in
the insurance companies' suggested safety techniques. 3 ' This
suggestion is perhaps the most important of all. Increased pre-
miums for noncompliance or incomplete compliance give the
air carriers an incentive to engage in the requested actions.
This technique is a form of forced retention. The insurance
company accepts the risks created by unsafe practices and places
them back on the insured air carrier.
3. Using Insurers to Keep Risk Management Information Private
Another aspect of insurer-based risk management is that it
protects the insured air carrier from the risks of civil liability and
public opinion damage created by regulatory or self-executed
risk management.132 As a nonparty in a tort liability suit, the
insurance company probably cannot be forced to reveal its
records. 33 If the insurance company retains all of the informa-
tion and only provides its insureds with suggestions as to how to
improve their safety, a jury will never be able to hear the chain-
of-events analysis or possible actions that the air carrier could
have taken in an attempt to avoid a crash.
V. CONCLUSION
Acting in society incurs risks. We acknowledge this when we
purchase insurance or even when we decide to stay home rather
than brave icy roads on our way to work. Air carriers are no
exception. Their everyday business activity of flying passengers
and cargo from one location to another creates a measurable
risk of accidents that will deprive citizens of property or life. It is
impossible to avoid those risks, but intelligent management can
bring them to a level we are willing to accept.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
131 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 12.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 101-10, for a discussion of the adverse
evidentiary and goodwill effects created by these types of risk management.
133 Indeed, the insurance coverage contract often disavows any right to the
insurer being sued along with its insured.
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The industry's safety record is good, but not above reproach.
Aging fleets, overworked pilots, and increasingly prevalent social
differences create new risks and challenges to the industry's
safety record. When we consider the technological advances of
the present age, it is apparent that safety records should be im-
proving, not merely maintaining their "acceptable levels."
Risk management operates on the principles of efficiency.
Just as the tort system is based on making economic decisions,
risk management follows dutifully on that path. Negligence
might be defined as "refusing to pay one dollar to avoid causing
two dollars worth of injury." Risk management might be de-
fined as "refusing to spend $1000 to control the probable loss of
$2000." If accidents can be avoided through reasonable risk
management, then that risk management should be executed.
The best way to determine how to avoid future accidents is to
carefully examine past accidents. The tension is created in de-
termining who should engage in those examinations. Currently,
the government does most of the investigations through the
NTSB. This is useful in determining the probable cause of the
incident, but it rarely offers useful solutions. The industry
knows itself better than an outside organization ever could. But
critical public self-evaluation, as in any potential tort situation,
can be disastrous if brought into court. Insurers have the expe-
rience to create good risk management programs. They also
may be able to discover the crucial chain of errors leading to an
accident without the danger of potential plaintiffs having access
to the information.
The problem with bare insurer risk management is that the
profit motive interferes with the implementation. Extensive risk
management programs cost money. If only a portion of the in-
surance industry engaged in aggressive risk management of its
insureds, those insurers would have to charge higher premiums.
Given the choice of insurers, air carriers would probably tend to
prefer the cheaper insurance companies that decided to forgo
insured risk management.
The solution may lie in hybridization and cooperation. As
government downsizing becomes more popular, enacting
sweeping regulations on airline risk management could be polit-
ical suicide. But there may be a way to create more risk manage-
ment and decrease government intervention. The present
insurance minimum regulations should be kept in place, but the
NTSB should be relieved of its crash investigation functions. In-
stead, new regulations should replace the current investigative
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functions, mandating that insurers investigate their own in-
sureds' crashes. The mandated investigations could be as broad
or broader than those required by the present regulations, but
the power would be vested in insurance companies. The only
requirement would be that the investigators reveal the probable
cause of the accident to the NTSB.
Once the information resided in the insurers' databases, it
would naturally lend itself to more aggressive risk management
programs. By tying premiums and coverage to conditions, the
insurers would influence the carriers to act in a safer manner.
Of course, this assumes that accident loss savings from better
risk management would outweigh the risk management costs,
creating a profit motive for insurers. If that were not the case,
then government regulations requiring the insurers to create air
carrier risk management would even the playing field. When
the profit motive fails to accomplish the desired end, govern-
ment regulation can create the needed incentives.
